10 Sep Agreement On A Comprehensive Settlement Of The Conflict In Afghanistan Pdf
Finally, after having preserved as a victory a signed agreement with the United States, the Taliban could extend negotiations to appease the United States – sacrificing their time, while the US military completes its withdrawal and allows the group to then strengthen its military campaign and try to overthrow the Afghan government. The Taliban`s recent escalation of violence raises questions not only about their ability to control isis members, but also about the Taliban`s commitment to the agreements they have signed. If the Taliban simply use participation in negotiations to appease outside actors or pursue other goals, peace could be jeopardized. The agreement between the United States and the Taliban and the Afghan government`s joint statement do not contain any provisions that leave room for civil society organizations to participate meaningfully in discussions about the future of the country. This could have an impact on the inclusion of inter-Afghan negotiations and the ability of the negotiations to reflect the concerns of the wider population. For the Taliban, internal divisions have made it more difficult to implement the U.S.-Taliban agreement and raised questions about the Taliban`s judicious participation in intra-Afghan talks. Although Taliban deputy leader Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar signed the agreement between the United States and the Taliban on behalf of the group, the Taliban are not a monolith. There are many different political groups that need to be recognised or taken into account in all negotiations. Some Taliban members have already refused to recognize the deal and some may try to strengthen their relations with the Islamic State in Khorasan. Given that some of these groups may not be willing to compromise, the prospect that further fragmentation within the movement may seriously hamper peace efforts. After lengthy negotiations, the U.S.-Taliban agreement and the Afghan U.S. government`s joint statement were signed in February 2020. These agreements were seen as necessary and important first steps towards inter-Afghan negotiations — and thus towards achieving peace in Afghanistan — but they do not guarantee that inter-Afghan negotiations will be successful.
Secondly, the issues relating to the composition of a future Afghan State must be clarified so that the negotiations can be considered a success. The Afghan government and the Taliban will need to address fundamental concerns about ideology, as well as deep and practical concerns about power-sharing, transitional justice, and the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of the Taliban into the Afghan security forces. The Taliban`s stated goal for Afghanistan was to recreate the Islamic Emirate that was overthrown in 2001. If the Taliban take seriously their willingness to participate meaningfully in these negotiations and reach a power-sharing agreement with the Afghan government, they must be flexible and willing to compromise to achieve this and other goals. First, how the United States and its allies will be able to judge that the necessary conditions for the full withdrawal of armed forces are met and whether the United States will be able to renegotiate the sanctions against the Taliban and, ultimately, lift them. The first 135 days of the agreement have passed and the United States has reduced troops to 8,600 and withdrawn troops from 5 bases, as stipulated in the agreement between the United States and the Taliban and in the joint statement with the Afghan government. However, Taliban attacks have increased across the country after the agreement was signed and it remains to be seen if and how the US will react. The UN sanctions monitoring team for Afghanistan has also expressed concerns [PDF] about the ability of the US and the UN Security Council to lift sanctions against the Taliban because of their links with al-Qaeda, and whether it will be possible to address the Taliban`s dependence on drug trafficking for profit. . .